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Farago´ et al (hereafter FMS&G) draw attention to an important issue for researchers of human-robot in-6
teraction (HRI): can we conceive a scheme for making social robot behaviour both comprehensible and7
appropriate in human social settings? We agree with the authors concerning the potential utility of drawing8
on the example of domestic animals — particularly dogs, the species with which we have the longest his-9
tory of co-evolution as social interactors. Here we seek to extend from the authors emphasis on the detail of10
species-specific interaction to a general blueprint for robot action selection. We particularly emphasise the11
integral role of emotions in facilitating social inter-action selection as social signals of internal agent states12
that are relevant to joint action.13
Our research questions concern the general abilities of artificial agents, particularly robots, to express14
their current, transient internal states in ways that people find comprehensible and acceptable. This requires15
that researchers consider not only the potential communicative value of a social signal but also the validity16
or utility of the internal state which it describes. Were it the case that the role of the human was to correctly17
identify a signal, as a passive observer of the robot, it would be a simple matter to construct a repertoire of18
discriminable social actions. However, this leads us to an important issue in HRI research not emphasised by19
FMS&G : the nature of interaction itself as a concept that requires simultaneous consideration of the actors20
and the acted-upon. Dynamic selection decisions for emotional signalling must depend on considerations21
that span human and robot: a question of emotional inter-action selection.22
1 Interaction must support the construction and refinement of human mental23
models24
Interaction differs from individual action in that it requires consideration of at least two entities: the actor25
and the acted-upon. An action can be described uniquely (if rather unsatisfactorily) in terms of the behaviour26
of a particular actor in isolation. An attempt to describe interaction in such a way is meaningless. Since the27
Norman [16] Theory of Action, human-computer interactions are typically understood as a cycle of: goal-28
directed plan formulation based on an internal model of the effects of a particular action on an object or29
system, execution of the plans, observation of the result, and reformulation. Reformulation may include30
updating the agents internal model, alteration of the plan, or alteration of the internal model, and may be31
conducted on-the-fly to compensate for low-level execution errors [15]. In the human case, the internal32
model is typically referred to as a ‘mental model’ of a system with which a person interacts — a model33
that encapsulates a person’s own understanding of that system and their capabilities with respect to it.34
As humans automatically ascribe agency to robots, any robot’s signalling mechanism will naturally be35
treated as indicative of its internal functioning, and human ‘mental models’ of the robot will be constructed36
accordingly. As a result, a signalling system that is intended only to improve the superficial acceptability of37
a robot will almost certainly not succeed. It is necessary to consider how one might engineer a meaningful38
relationship between any robots internal state and the social signals it produces.39
As FMS&G correctly state, social communication is typically identified with affective states. It is less40
clear that the authors recognise that many emotional states are not simply broadcast but are often directed at41
other agents in particular. Social communication may be exclusively about interpersonal affective attitudes42
(John smiles at Jane→John likes Jane) or combined with other social significance (Jane smiles at and mo-43
tions John towards a cafe´→Jane likes John and proposes that they eat together). In the case of social robots,44
we can expect mental model generation to be facilitated by the human tendency to anthropomorphize any45
system with uninspectable internal states. McCarthy [12] famously argued that more humanly manageable46
interactions result from the ascription of mental qualities to machines, especially beliefs, knowledge, inten-47
tions, and wants. It is quite simply easier for people to understand machines in these terms than in terms48
of their underlying architecture or functionality. Consequently, people routinely attribute affective states to49
machines as part of a “social actor” strategy for informally modelling hidden processes [19]. Moreover,50
people anticipate that such objects or agents will respond to them in emotional ways [4].51
2 The Value of Emotions in Social Human-Robot Interaction52
Emotions are not only key to reducing dithering and stabilising individual action selection [3], but also joint53
inter-action selection. As such, they are an important part of the embodiment necessary for social interaction54
[5]. For the purpose of this commentary, we refer to emotional action selection as action selection based on55
temporary but durative state triggered by response to observed events combined with internal motivation. To56
demonstrate the value of emotions in social HRI we turn to the list of social skills highlighted by FMS&G:57
cooperating, communicating in different modalities (e.g. visual and acoustic), and showing individuality.58
We analyse these from a constructivist perspective [6] taking particular account of the role of emotions.59
2.1 Emotions in Cooperation60
Cooperation is an important social skill, well developed in dogs and certainly useful to implement in social61
robots. However, it would be difficult to associate cooperation with specific behavioural patterns. Rather62
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than looking for a specific personal behaviour which accompanies human-robot cooperation, it could be63
more useful to focus on general facilitators of and influences on cooperation.64
The persuasion approach to cooperation indicates that cooperation increases after the presentation of65
persuasive messages [22]. Persuasion here is understood as a form of social influence [1], a way to influ-66
ence people through communication without using force. In order to persuade it is necessary, among other67
things, to induce or evoke affective states (whether moods, sentiments or emotions). Although effective68
non-emotional verbal persuasion techniques certainly exist, non-verbal messages are of the greatest impor-69
tance in persuasion [13], and the emotional component, in at least some conditions, has been shown to have70
priority over the informational one [14].71
The topic of affective persuasion is addressed in many disciplines, including marketing, law, and pol-72
itics, as well as in daily life. However, little work is currently done on the role of emotions in influencing73
human behaviour in the area of HRI [7].74
2.2 Emotions in Communicating Personality and Individuality across Modalities75
FMS&G claim that a behaviour of a dog wagging its tail can be considered as a part of a greeting behaviour,76
“probably signalling the excitement”. The authors also suggest using a general visual signal as “a functional77
analogue of a tail, with similar dynamics but different appearance and position”. The authors do not explain78
clearly what is considered to be a primary function of a dogs tail wagging and how different its implemen-79
tation should be in a robot. Researchers explain a functionality of tail movements both in dogs and in other80
animals in many different ways, e.g. female goats stimulate sexual interest from a male by wagging a tail81
[8], a cat’s tail plays an important role in balance during locomotion[25]. Even in dogs, much is communi-82
cated by the height and stiffness of the tail as well as the rate and enthusiasm of its wagging [11], and even83
the direction of its wagging [24]. One very important function of tail wagging and many other gestures in84
dogs is expression of dominance status. To humans they often express subordinate status, a fact that may85
be critical to the health benefits of canine companions. This important aspect of the relationship between86
humans and dogs may also explain some of the dogs’ responses to unusual anti-social behaviour by their87
owners.88
Obviously (and as the authors imply) robots have very different appearances, and it is unlikely that a89
direct simulation of dogs’ tail-wagging behavior can help every robots signal excitement (or subordinance)90
in all the situations. On the other hand, it should be possible to express internal state of a robot in an91
understandable way using a variety of modalities at once — facial expressions (where a face is present)92
[23], gestures [20], sounds [18], language [10], colour, brightness, and even the overall shape of a robot [9].93
It is also possible that it is worth adding effectors for communicating emotion, as has been highly successful94
with the ears of Kismet [2]. Such a multi-modal approach helps to make robots both more acceptable and95
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more understandable for people, and to make them appear more individual and independent, thus increasing96
their life-likeness through emerging of a robots ‘personality’.97
In consideration of the results FMS&G present, it is also worth remembering first that dogs and owners98
all have individual personality, and not every dog/owner coupling will be equally well suited. This will also99
be a consideration for robotics: some owners will want more or less proactive, confident, open or attentive100
robots. Second, dogs are cognitive systems. Some of their orientation behaviour will not be merely commu-101
nicative but also triggered by uncertainty in an unusual situation and the need to gather more information.102
But in closely-coupled agents, every action is also an interaction, so it is not surprising that these functional103
gestures are perceived as, and therefore serve as, communicative acts as well.104
3 Implications for Research on Affective Interactive Robots105
We have argued that emotional state and expression are critical to cooperation, including that between106
person and machine. Our current work approaches this problem by modelling artificial emotions as internal107
states that factor into a dynamic action selection process. This process couples the synthetic-emotional108
state with external cues for communicating discrete emotional states to a human before and during the109
execution of those actions [17]. Artificial emotions can be connected with the goals of the robot and thus110
can also be triggered by a list of conditions [2]: e.g. the presence of an undesired stimulus, presence of a111
desired stimulus, a sudden stimulus, or delay in achieving goal. We are currently experimenting with robots’112
internal emotional state represented in two dimensions, following a simple valence and arousal model of113
human affect [23], though we have also explored discrete representations [3]. There are many possible ways114
to construct such internal state, given a range of sensor input, goal structure and action feedback; our current115
approach is to change the state dynamically such that it feeds back into the computation of subsequent levels116
of intensity, treating robot emotion as a latched process that is tied in to its external expression [21]. The117
key idea following on from the commentary above is that for robot emotion to function effectively in human118
interactions, it is necessary to consider the internal relevance of the emotional state for the robots operation119
so that intelligible mappings can be made to a set of signals for the robots human partner. Without this step,120
the social epithet not only has little meaning but emotion is also unlikely to serve interactions well.121
4 Conclusions122
For robot behaviour to be understandable to people, it must be designed to facilitate the progressive con-123
struction of human mental models. All human mental models are constructed through personal interactions124
with systems, reflecting the characteristics of those systems and beliefs about the utility and dangers that125
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might arise through their use. Human mental models for social interaction inevitably include social compo-126
nents, especially those that support inferences about internal affective state and external signals and actions.127
The personal history of an individual with a robot means that each mental model is likely to be unique.128
Affective states, such as transient emotions, are part-and-parcel of social signalling. An effective design129
strategy for human-robot interactions depends on an architectural commitment to maintaining robot states130
that are material to interactions with humans, and that may then be communicated to their human users. The131
social acceptability of a robot certainly depends on the ability of a person to infer a usable understanding of132
the robot from its behaviour and signals. However, social acceptability also relates to a broader meaning of133
social interaction that embeds the rights and responsibilities of social agents towards one another. If signals134
give rise to unrealistic mental models, they are likely to result in rejection or worse.135
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